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 To Begin the Nation Anew:
 Congress, Citizenship, and Civil Rights
 after the Civil War
 ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI
 IN 1857, THE HIGHEST COURT IN THE UNITED STATES HELD THAT BLACKS in America
 possessed no rights, could never become citizens of the United States, and that
 Congress was powerless to abolish slavery.' In the aftermath of these pronounce-
 ments, this country fought one of the bloodiest wars in its history. Fewer than ten
 years after the Dred Scott decision, however, Congress and the Northern states
 accomplished precisely what the Supreme Court declared could not be done,
 through constitutional amendments and a civil rights statute. The Thirteenth
 Amendment abolished slavery everywhere in the United States. The Civil Rights
 Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment conferred citizenship on and secured
 the civil rights of all qualified, natural-born, and naturalized Americans, including
 former slaves and free blacks. The statute declared illegal infringements of certain
 civil rights made under the prextext of law or custom and authorized the removal
 of civil and criminal cases from the state to the federal courts whenever Americans
 were unable to enforce their rights in the state systems ofjustice. The Fourteenth
 Amendment also expressly prohibited the states from infringing the rights that
 Americans enjoyed as citizens of the United States and their rights to due process
 and equal protection of the law.
 The meaning and scope of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and
 the Civil Rights Act of 1866 have been almost as controversial among twentieth-
 century scholars as they were among the participants in Reconstruction. In 1947,
 Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black sparked a debate over the scope of a national
 authority to enforce civil rights when he held that the Fourteenth Amendment
 conferred on the national government the power to protect the Bill of Rights
 against state infringements.2 Charles Fairman quickly wrote a rebuttal, in which
 he insisted that the congressional framers intended to secure only an equality in
 state law among the few rights enumerated in Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act, a
 view he continued to maintain. William Crosskey published a rejoinder to Fairman,
 I wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of Eric Foner, Kermit Hall, Paul Murphy, William Nelson,
 George Rappaport, David Reiser, and the participants of the New York University School of Law
 Colloquium in Legal History.
 1 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. (60 U.S.) 393, 404 (1857).
 2 Adamson v. California, 322 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
 45
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 in which Crosskey asserted his view of a nation-centered federalism that delegated
 to Congress the authority to enforce the Bill of Rights, a view he later elaborated
 in his three-volume history of the U.S. Constitution.3 The specific question
 whether or not the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights has
 been vigorously debated, most recently by Raoul Berger and Michael Curtis.4
 Other legal scholars and historians have focused on additional aspects of a
 national civil rights enforcement authority. Jacobus tenBroek and Howard Jay
 Graham argued that the theory of the Reconstruction amendments derived from
 the natural rights ideology of the abolitionists, and that the amendments delegated
 to Congress an expansive authority to enforce fundamental rights.5 They assumed
 that it was the Radicals who controlled Congress during Reconstruction and
 incorporated their expansive view into the Reconstruction amendments. Revi-
 sionist historians in the 1960s argued that the moderate Republicans, not the
 Radicals, controlled Congress and formulated Reconstruction policy.6
 Although revisionist political historians of the 1 960s agreed that even moderate
 Republicans were committed to securing civil rights after the Civil War, revisionist
 legal historians in the 1970s argued that the Reconstruction amendments did not
 significantly alter American federal constitutionalism. Insisting that the moderates
 were legal conservatives who consciously intended to avoid a revolutionary
 restructuring of constitutional law and to retain a federalism based on states' rights,
 the revisionists concluded that the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amend-
 ment preserved in the states primary authority over citizenship and civil rights.
 The states therefore continued to enjoy the authority to determine the status of
 Americans, define their rights, and provide for their protection. The framers of
 the legislation intended that citizens redress violations of civil rights and enforce
 their rights through state courts and law enforcement agencies. Conscious of the
 revolutionary implications for American federalism, the framers conferred on the
 national government merely the authority to prohibit the states from discrimi-
 3 Charles Fairman, "Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original
 Understanding," Stanford Law Review, 2 (1949): 5; Charles Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion,
 1864-88 (Part One), vol. 6 of History of the Supreme Court of the United States, P. Freund, ed. (NeW York,
 1971), see especially chaps. 19 and 21; William Crosskey, "Charles Fairman, 'Legislative History' and
 the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority," University of Chicago Law Review, 22 (1954): 1; see
 also Charles Fairman, "A Reply to Professor Crosskey," p. 144; William Crosskey, Politics and the
 Constitution in the History of the United States, 3 vols. (1953, 1980), especially chaps. 30-32.
 4 For the recent debate, see Raoul Berger, Government byJudiciary: The Transformation of theFourteenth
 Amendment (Cambridge, Mass., 1977); Michael Curtis, "The Bill of Rights as a Limitation on State
 Authority: A Reply to Professor Berger," Wake Forest Law Review, 16 (1980): 45; Michael Curtis, "The
 Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights," ConnecticutLaw Review, 44 (1982): 237; Michael Curtis,
 No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights (Durham, N.C., 1986); Raoul
 Berger, "Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine-Lived Cat," Ohio
 State Law Journal, 42 (1981): 435; and Raoul Berger, "Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: A Reply to
 Michael Curtis' Response," Ohio State Law Journal, 44 (1983): 1.
 5Jacobus tenBroek, Equal under Law (New York, 1965); Howard Jay Graham, "The Early
 Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment," Wisconsin Law Review (1950): 479; and
 Howard Jay Graham, "Our Declaratory Fourteenth Amendment," Stanford Law Review, 7 (1954): 3.
 6 See Eric McKitrick, AndrewJohnson and Reconstruction (Chicago, 1960); William Brock, An American
 Crisis: Congress and Reconstruction, 1864-1867 (New York, 1963); and La Wanda Cox and John Cox,
 Politics, Principle, and Prejudice, 1865-1866 (New York, 1963).
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 nating among citizens on the basis of race in matters relating to civil rights and to
 punish state officers who did so.7
 CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS BELIEVED THAT THE THIRTEENTH AND FOURTEENTH
 AMENDMENTS and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 represented a revolutionary change
 in American constitutionalism.8 A change in federalism was a prerequisite for
 Congress to legislate for the protection of civil rights, in light of the nineteenth-
 century concept of federalism. If the status and fundamental rights of citizenship
 were the rights that individuals enjoyed as citizens of the states, Congress would
 not have had the authority to legislate for their protection. These fundamental
 rights would be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the states. The proposal by
 Congress of a constitutional amendment and a statute that conferred on all
 Americans the precious status of citizen, enumerated some of the fundamental
 rights of citizenship, and extended to citizens federally enforceable guarantees for
 the protection of their civil rights was itself a revolutionary change in American
 federalism.
 The radical change in American constitutionalism represented by the actions of
 Congress forced congressional Republicans to formulate a legal theory delegating
 to Congress the authority to secure the status and civil rights of Americans.
 Republicans explained that sovereignty resided in the national government and
 included the primary authority to determine the status and secure the rights of all
 Americans, white as well as black.9 They interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment
 7 See Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-88, 1228-29; Berger, Government by Judiciary;
 Harold Hyman, A More Perfect Union: The Impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on the Constitution
 (New York, 1973), especially pp. 457, 460-68; Michael Les Benedict, A Compromise of Principle:
 Congressional Republicans and Reconstruction (New York, 1974), 27, 41, 48, 56-69, 122-26, 147-49, 170;
 Michael Les Benedict, "Preserving the Constitution: The Conservative Basis of Radical Reconstruc-
 tion,"Journal of American History, 61 (1974): 65; Phillip Paludan, A Covenant with Death: The Constitution,
 Law, and Equality in the Civil War Era (Urbana, Ill., 1975), 58, 261, 274-75; Herman Belz, Emancipation
 and Equal Rights: Politics and Constitutionalism in the Civil War Era (New York, 1978), 108-40; and
 Herman Belz, A New Birth of Freedom: The Republican Party and Freedmen's Rights, 1861-1866 (New York,
 1976), 157-77.
 8 See Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Politics of Judicial Interpretation: The Federal Courts, Department of
 Justice and Civil Rights, 1866-1876 (New York, 1985), and "Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era
 of the Civil War and Reconstruction," New York University Law Review, 61 (1986), forthcoming. The
 essential conceptual framework and conclusions of this study relating to the legislative history of the
 Fourteenth Amendment and Civil Rights Act of 1866 were originally presented in Robert J.
 Kaczorowski, "The Nationalization of Civil Rights: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a Racist
 Society, 1866-1883 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1971); "Race, Law and Politics:
 Congress and Civil Rights after the Civil War," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern
 Historical Association, November, 1973; and "Civil Rights in the Lower Federal and State Courts
 during Reconstruction," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Organization of American
 Historians, April, 1975. See also Harold Hyman and William Wiecek, Equal Justice under the Law:
 Constitutional Development, 1835 to 1875 (New York, 1982), 386-438; Belz, Emancipation and Equal Rights,
 108-40; and Belz, A New Birth of Freedom, 157-77.
 9 For example, the "father" of the Fourteenth Amendment, Cong. John A. Bingham of Ohio, in
 a statement that represented the views of his congressional colleagues, declared that the authority to
 secure the rights of citizens "belongs to every sovereign power, and is essentially a subject of national
 jurisdiction." Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 1090. This view of national sovereignty
 was also expressed outside of Congress. See the letter of "Madison" published in the New York Times
 (November 15, 1866): 2. Other scholars have noted this interpretation, but they reached different
 conclusions concerning the scope of authority the amendment delegated to Congress. See Belz,
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 as a constitutional guarantee of the status of Americans as free people and
 therefore as a delegation of authority to Congress to secure the fundamental rights
 of American citizens. Congressional Republicans reasoned that the amendment,
 in abolishing slavery, secured liberty and the rights of free people. They equated
 the status and rights of free people with the status and natural rights of citizens.
 Congressional Republicans understood the Thirteenth Amendment as a guaran-
 tee of the status and rights of citizenship. Applying a Hamiltonian, nationalistic
 interpretation of the Constitution, which attributed to Congress the authority to
 secure rights that are recognized or guaranteed by the Constitution, they
 concluded that the Thirteenth Amendment delegated to Congress the authority
 to prohibit slavery and, more important, the authority to secure inherent rights
 of all U.S. citizens against violation from any source in whatever manner Congress
 deemed appropriate. IO Thus, James F. Wilson, the representative from Iowa and
 the House floor manager of the Civil Rights Bill, introduced it with the explanation
 "that the possession of these rights by the citizen raises by necessary implication
 the power in Congress to protect them."1'
 Republicans expressed in law their understanding of the scope of the Thirteenth
 Amendment when they enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth
 Amendment. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act confers citizenship on all qualified
 American inhabitants and guarantees to all American citizens at least some of the
 rights the framers believed to be fundamental. 12 They added a similar citizenship
 clause to the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment in the event that a
 subsequent Congress repealed the Civil Rights Act. The addition of this clause was
 also designed to prevent courts from declaring the statute unconstitutional by
 Emancipation and Equal Rights, 108-40; Daniel Farber and John Meunch, "The Ideological Origins of
 the Fourteenth Amendment," Constitutional Commentary, 1 (1984): 235, 262-63.
 " The framers believed that the Congress possessed plenary authority over civil rights, as established
 by the following: Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, pp. 41-42 (Sen. Sherman); pp. 43,
 474, 476, 527-28, 573-74, 600, 1758, 1780-81 (Sen. Trumbull); pp. 503-04 (Sen. Howard); p. 570
 (Sen. Morrill); pp. 602, 741 (Sen. Lane of Indiana); p. 703 (Sen. Fessendon); p. 768 (Sen. Johnson);
 pp. 571, 3031-32 (Sen. Henderson); p. 1225 (Sen. Wilson); pp. 1255, 1780, 3037, Appendix 101 (Sen.
 Yates); Appendix 96 (Sen. Williams); pp. 1033, 1088-94, 1291, 2542 (Cong. Bingham); pp. 1115,
 1118-19, 1294-95 (Cong. Wilson); p. I 120 (Cong. Rogers); p. I 124 (Cong. Cook); pp. I 151-53 (C(ong.
 Thayer); p. 1262 (Cong. Broomall); p. 1266 (Cong. Raymond); p. 1295 (Cong. Latham); and pp. 1832,
 1836 (Cong. Lawrence). This understanding of a congressional civil rights enforcement authority was
 expressed outside of Congress as well. See the New York Tribune (February 3,1866): 6; Chicago Tribune
 (February 4, 1866): 2; New York Times (January 16, 1866): 4; (February 8, 1866): 4; (March 31, 1866):
 4; Baltimore American (March 23, 1866), clipping in Scrapbook on the Civil Rights Bill, Edward
 McPherson, ed., Edward McPherson Papers, Library of Congress, container 99, p. 4; and various
 undated clippings in the Scrapbook from the New York Sun, p. 15; Pittsburgh Gazette, p. 40; Cincinnati
 Gazette, pp. 40, 54: Syracuse journal, p. 53; Cleveland Herald, p. 54; and the Chicago Post, p. 58, among
 others.
 " Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, pp. 1118-19. I established that this was also the
 understanding of U.S. judges and attorneys in Politics of Judicial Interpretation, 1-12, 27-48.
 12 Section I provides that such citizens "shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in
 the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit,
 pur-chase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all
 laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall
 be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance,
 regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding"; 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
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 interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment as a mere abrogation of slavery.'3 The
 citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes explicit the constitutional
 recognition of the status and natural rights of citizens that its framers believed was
 implied in the Thirteenth Amendment. The ratification of the Fourteenth
 Amendment in 1868 thus completed the constitutional revolution regarding
 citizenship and civil rights. Congressional Republicans legislated to secure the civil
 rights of Americans in 1866 with the understanding that, with the Thirteenth and
 then the Fourteenth Amendment, the Constitution of the United States gave to
 all Americans the fundamental rights of citizenship and delegated to Congress the
 authority to protect citizens in their enjoyment of these rights.14
 A striking feature of the framers' intent in 1866 is their adoption of the most
 radical abolitionist theory of constitutionalism before the Civil War. 15 By 1866, not
 only radicals but all moderate and even some conservative Republicans supported
 the efforts of Congress to secure civil rights. 16 This shift reveals the extent to which
 the Civil War radicalized American politics. A political and constitutional position
 regarded as extreme and embraced by a very small minority before the Civil War
 had become mainstream Republicanism by 1866. The position that contempo-
 raries regarded as radical in 1866 was securing the voting rights of blacks. As a
 matter of law and as a matter of political objectives, most contemporaries
 distinguished between civil rights and voting rights.'7 The essential reason that
 Radical Republicans criticized the Fourteenth Amendment as too moderate was
 its failure to provide the same protection for voting rights as for civil rights.18
 The full reach of this revolution in constitutionalism could have changed the
 nature of American government from a federal republic with divided authority
 to a unitary state. Democratic opponents in Congress recognized the implications
 of the Republicans' theory of constitutionalism. Democrats objected to the
 proposed Fourteenth Amendment and Civil Rights Bill precisely because the
 13 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, pp. 1291-92 (Cong. Bingham); and p. 2896 (Sen.
 Howard).
 14 Supporters of civil rights enforcement insisted that U.S. citizenship, and not state citizenship,
 entitled Americans to all of the fundamental rights of citizenship and the enjoyment of these rights.
 See the debates among Senators Van Winkle, Cowan, Trumbull, Johnson, Davis, and Clark in
 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1 st sess., 1866, pp. 497-500, 506, 523-30, 600, 1777-81, and Appendix
 182. Opponents of congressional civil rights enforcement denied that Congress possessed the authority
 to determine the status and guarantee the rights of citizens within the states. Congressional Globe, 39th
 Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 1156 (Cong. Thornton); p. 1268 (Cong. Kerr); p. 1679 (Pres. Johnson's veto
 of the Civil Rights Bill); and pp. 1775-80 (Sen. Johnson). For a fuller discussion of these points, see
 Kaczorowski, "Revolutionary Constitutionalism."
 15 For a good analysis of antebellum abolitionist theories of constitutionalism and slavery, see William
 Wiecek, The Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism in America, 1760-1848 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1977). See also
 tenBroek, Equal under Law; and Graham, "Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment."
 16 See Benedict, A Compromise of Principle; Cox and Cox, Politics, Principle, and Prejudice.
 17 Good discussions of the political aspects of the suffrage issue are in La Wanda Cox andJohn Cox,
 "Negro Suffrage and Republican Politics: The Problem of Motivation in Reconstruction Historiog-
 raphy,"Journal of Social History, 33 (1967): 303; William Gillette, The Right to Vote: Politics and the Passage
 oftheFifteenthAmendment (Baltimore, Md., 1965). For representative comments in Congress on the issue
 of black suffrage, see Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1 st sess., 1866, pp. 476, 599 (Sen. Trumbull). For
 representative press commentary, see The Nation, 2 (April 26, 1866): 518; and the Chicago Tribune
 (February 5, 1866): 4.
 18 See Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, pp. 673, 675, 684 (Sen. Sumner); and
 Kaczorowski, "Nationalization of Civil Rights."
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 constitutional theory that these measures encompassed could be used by Congress
 to destroy the civil and criminal authority of states over their citizens. If, as
 proponents of civil rights insisted, the Constitution guaranteed the fundamental
 rights of citizenship, Congress could exercise exclusivejurisdiction over civil rights.
 National law could supplant state law and the national government could absorb
 "all reserved state sovereignty and rights."'9 Senator Garret Davis, Democrat from
 Kentucky, was one of several opponents who objected that "the principles involved
 in this bill, if they are legitimate and constitutional, would authorize Congress to
 pass civil and criminal codes for every State of the Union."20 These views were
 echoed by the House of Representatives, the White House, and the press.21
 These positions were a continuation of a constitutional battle that had raged for
 many years. Before the Civil War, the states had defined the status and secured
 the rights of the inhabitants of the United States. They performed these functions
 through state legal institutions, statutes, and courts. Some antebellum legal
 theorists argued, however, that the primary authority to perform these functions
 rested with the national government.22 The question of whether the national or
 state governments possessed ultimate authority to determine the status and
 enforce the rights of American inhabitants produced a national political and
 constitutional debate that centered on slavery and culminated in the South's
 secession in 1861. Secession, based on the constitutional theory of state sover-
 eignty, made the legal questions of federalism and the locus of sovereignty central
 issues of the Civil War. The North responded with Abraham Lincoln's theory of
 national sovereignty, which denied the existence of any state's right to secede.23
 The Emancipation Proclamation added the other central question, namely, which
 government possessed the primary constitutional authority to determine the status
 of American inhabitants.
 The antebellum constitutional questions of the nature of American federalism,
 the locus of sovereignty, and the primary authority over the status of Americans
 were thus joined as political issues in the Civil War. The causes of Unionism,
 national sovereignty, and emancipation were victorious on the battlefield. North-
 19 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, Appendix 185, pp. 156-58 (Sen. Davis).
 20 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 1414.
 21 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, pp. 1120, 1122, 2538 (Cong. Rogers); p. 1154
 (Cong. Eldridge); p. 1156 (Cong. Thornton); p. 1266 (Cong. Raymond); pp. 1268, 1270-71 (Cong.
 Kerr); p. 1295 (Cong. Latham); pp. 1679-81 (Pres. Johnson's veto); ex-Governor William Sharkey to
 Mississippi Governor Benjamin Humphreys, 17 September 1866, reprinted in unidentified newspaper,
 clipping in Scrapbook on the Fourteenth Amendment, Edward McPherson Papers, Library of
 Congress, container 100, p. 23; resolution of the Texas legislature rejecting ratification of the
 Fourteenth Amendment, reprinted in the New York Times (November 4, 1866): 2; resolution of the
 Kansas Senate Committee on the Fourteenth Amendment, reprinted in the Memphis Avalanche, n.d.,
 clipping in Scrapbook on the Fourteenth Amendment, Edward McPherson Papers, p. 55.
 John Hurd, The Law of Freedom and Bondage in the United States, 2 vols. (Boston, 1858, 1862); James
 Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1978); and Wiecek,
 Sources of Anti-Slavery Constitutionalism.
 23 These conflicting constitutional theories were expressed in the Southern state resolutions relating
 to secession and in President Lincoln's messages to Congress. "Mississippi Resolution on Secession,"
 in Documents in American History, Henry Commager, ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ., 1973), 373; "South
 Carolina Declaration of Causes of Secession," p. 372; "PresidentJ. Davis, Message to Congress," p. 389;
 Abraham Lincoln, "Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861," p. 393.
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 ern Republicans believed that the Civil War had resolved these political and
 constitutional questions. They soon discovered they were mistaken.24 Former
 Confederates tenaciously adhered to a philosophy of state sovereignty and refused
 to respect national authority. They defiantly resisted the emancipation guaranteed
 blacks by the Thirteenth Amendment. Southern white suprernacists denied the
 freedmen's freedom by continuing to treat them as if they were slaves. White
 supremacists frequently met the attempts of freed blacks to assert their constitu-
 tionally guaranteed freedom with violent repression and economic intimidation.
 Moreover, they treated white Unionists and federal officers with disrespect, and
 resorted to economic intimidation and violence toward them as well.25
 Local officials in the South sanctioned and legitimized the defiant behavior of
 individuals and the racial and political customs of communities dominated by
 whites. In their constitutions and laws, Southern states refused to recognize that
 blacks were citizens possessing the natural rights of free people.26 State officers
 commonly failed or refused to protect the personal safety and property of blacks.
 They similarly refused to extend this protection to whites who were political allies
 or federal agents of blacks. When Southern blacks and politically unpopular whites
 were the victims of crimes, they could not get sheriffs to arrest, courts to try, or
 juries to convict the perpetrators. When charged with crimes or sued in the civil
 courts, blacks seldom received impartialjustice. Indeed, white Unionists and freed
 blacks were prosecuted and sent to prison during peacetime for aiding the U.S.
 forces during the war. Southern hostility persuaded Northern Republicans and
 Southern Unionists that secessionist and Confederate sentiments had survived the
 Civil War.27 By the end of 1865, the constitutional and political process of restoring
 the Southern states to the Union had become the problem of preserving the
 principles for which the war had been fought.
 24 According to Eric McKitrick, Southern recalcitrance immediately after Appomattox was perceived
 by Northern Republicans as endangering the fruits of the Union victory. The refusal of many former
 Confederates to accept defeat necessitated the measures of Reconstruction, in the minds of Northern
 Republicans. McKitrick, Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction, 21-41.
 25 Michael Perman, Reunion without Compromise: The South andReconstruction, 1865-1868 (Cambridge,
 1973); Leon Litwack, Been in the Storm So Long: The Aftermath of Slavery (New York, 1979). Congressional
 Republicans received reports of these conditions while they were framing the Fourteenth Amendment
 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See Grant Goodrich to Lyman Trumbull, 1 February 1866, Lyman
 Trumbull Papers, Library of Congress; Brigadier General J. W. Sprague to John Sherman, 4 April
 1866, John Sherman Papers; George A. Custer to Zachariah Chandler, 14 January 1866, Zachariah
 Chandler Papers, Library of Congress. These reports were confirmed by Congress's own investigations.
 See Joint Committee on Reconstruction, Report, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866; Freedmen's Affairs, 39th
 Cong., Ist sess., Senate Exec. Doc. 66 (1866); and Murder of Union Soldiers, 39th Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept.
 23 (1866).
 26 Kaczorowski, Politics of Judicial Interpretation, 27-44; Niemen, To Set the Law in Motion; James
 Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge, La., 1967); Theodore
 Wilson, The Black Codes of the South (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 1965).
 27 The conclusion that Southerners abused white Unionists and freed blacks and that observers
 interpreted this abuse as hostility toward and resistance to federal authority was expressed in letters
 to congressional Republicans, such as those cited in note 24 above and the following: William Ware
 Peck to Charles Sumner, 1 January 1866, Charles Sumner Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard
 University; and George W. Kingsbury to Justin S. Morrill, 18 June 1866, Justin S. Morrill Papers,
 Library of Congress.
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 THE CIVIL WAR HAD BEEN A UNIQUELY PARTISAN WAR. Republicans stood for Union
 and emancipation; Democrats were associated with leniency toward Confederate
 secessionists and slavery. When President Andrew Johnson attempted a quick
 restoration of the Confederate states after the war, Democrats rallied behind him.
 Restoration by the president presented insuperable political problems, however.
 It preserved the political leadership of the same individuals and groups that had
 led the Southern states into secession and civil war.28 If Republicans acquiesced in
 Johnson's plan, their Democratic opponents would gain ascendancy by joining
 with the late belligerents of the South, an outcome unacceptable to Northern
 Republicans. It would condone "traitorism" and betray their Unionist allies in the
 South. But achievement of Republican political objectives in the South, which
 included a political power base of white Unionists and free blacks, would require
 a change in Southern political leadership. Political participation of the Republi-
 cans' Southern allies necessitated a federal presence to protect them from the
 hostility of the dominant Democratic Conservative white supremacists. As the Civil
 War was a partisan effort associated with and led by the Republican party, so
 Reconstruction was a partisan postwar readjustment controlled by and identified
 with Northern Republicans.
 In 1866, the political context of civil rights deprivations compelled Congress to
 take effective measures to secure the fundamental rights of American citizens.
 Although Republicans shrank from providing freed blacks with economic inde-
 pendence through land redistribution, they did offer legal recognition of their
 liberty by securing important rights for their economic autonomy, such as the
 rights to enter into contracts and to buy and sell property. Congressional
 Republicans put aside racial prejudice that ordinarily would have precluded the
 legal enforcement of civil rights.29 The factors motivating them included the
 perceived need to preserve the objectives for which so many thousands gave their
 lives, the obligation to make effective the freedom they had promised to Southern
 blacks, a sense of elemental fairness and justice, as well as political self-interest. All
 these objectives were served by providing for the personal safety and security of
 Southern political allies-civilians of both races and federal officers. The political
 ideology of the Republican party further diminished the effects of Northern white
 racism on congressional Republicans. The central ideas of the party were the
 theory of natural rights, a classic liberalism, and a belief in equal opportunity. The
 combination served as a concept of American nationalism, distinguishing Repub-
 28 G. Koerner to Lyman Trumbull, 11 January 1866, Trumbull Papers, Library of Congress; H. B.
 Allis to Benjamin F. Wade, 21 March 1866, Benjamin F. Wade Papers, Library of Congress; Joel Silbey,
 A Respectable Minority: The Democratic Party in the Civil War Era, 1860-1868 (New York, 1977); Perman,
 Reunion without Compromise.
 29 Useful discussions of white racism and its effect on the politics of the era include George
 Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-American Character and Destiny,
 1817-1914 (New York, 1963); Forrest Wood, Black Scare: The Racist Response to Emancipation and
 Reconstruction (Berkeley, Calif., 1970); V. Jacque Voegeli, Free But Not Equal: The Midwest and the Negro
 during the Civil War (Chicago, 1967); C. Vann Woodward, "Seeds of Failure in Radical Race Policy,"
 American Philosophical Society Proceedings, 1 10 (1966): 1.
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 lican notions of Unionism and American freedom from the Southern Democratic
 Conservative ideology of states' rights and slavery.30
 Northern Republicans decided that the preservation of American nationhood
 and freedom, as they understood them, required a strong central government to
 combat the danger posed by Southern recalcitrance. Republican William
 Lawrence of Ohio invoked political necessity when he warned the House that the
 congressional protection of civil rights was "essential to preserve national life, and
 the means of national existence."3l Withholding this protection would be tanta-
 mount to permitting the Southern states to divest citizens of their rights in the
 aftermath of Appomattox. The editor of the Philadelphia American echoed this
 theme in urging ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment: "If there be one lesson
 written in bloody letters by the [Civil] War, it is that the national citizenship must
 be paramount to that of the State. We propose to make it so ... This citizenship
 provision is one of the most vital principles developed by the war. Without it we
 shall inevitably be exposed to new wars of Secession and States rights and
 nullification."32 The governor of Wisconsin, Lucius Fairchild, transmitted a copy
 of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment to the state legislature and urged
 ratification "because, in view of the terrible events of the past five years, we deem
 these guarantees necessary to the life of the nation, and we insist that those who
 saved that life have an undeniable right to demand full guarantees to its future
 preservation."33
 The conjunction of political ideology and political necessity resulted in con-
 gressional Republicans embracing a revolutionary theory of constitutionalism. To
 achieve political power in the South, to preserve their wartime objectives of
 Unionism and freedom for slaves, they insisted that sovereignty resided in the
 federal government and included primary authority to determine the status and
 secure the rights of all Americans, white and black. Republican supporters of the
 Reconstruction amendments and the civil rights statute acknowledged the
 revolutionary changes they had wrought in American federalism by delegating
 plenary authority over citizenship and civil rights to the national government.34
 30 For analyses of the Republican party's ideology, see Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The
 Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War (London, 1970); Yehoshua Arieli, Individualism and
 Nationalism in American Ideology (Cambridge, 1964). Examples of this Republican ideology include Sen.
 Lyman Trumbull's speech in the Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 474; John Andrews,
 Valedictory Address of his Excellency John A. Andrews to the Two Branches of the Legislature of Massachusetts,
 Jan. 4, 1866 (Boston, 1866); Benjamin Butler, The Status of the Insurgent States upon Cessation of Hostilities:
 Speech delivered before the Pennsylvania Legislature, Apr. 11, 1866 (Washington, D.C., 1866).
 31 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., lstsess., 1866, pp. 1832, 1836. See also p. 1090 (Cong. Bingham);
 pp. 1262-63 (Cong. Broomall); and Appendix 99 (Sen. Yates).
 32 Clipping in Scrapbook on the Fourteenth Amendment, Edward McPherson Papers, Library of
 Congress, p. 41.
 33 Unidentified newspaper in Scrapbook on the Fourteenth Amendment, p. 63.
 34 See Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, pp. 1065-67 (Cong. Higby); p. 1066 (Cong.
 Price); p. 2442 (Sen. Howard); pp. 2534-35 (Cong. Ecklay); p. 2961 (Sen. Poland). See above, notes
 9,10, 11, and 31 for evidence that the framers' view of constitutionalism, as it was expressed in Congress
 and discussed in the press, held that Congress possessed plenary authority to secure civil rights.
 Opponents objected because they understood that Republican constitutionalism was revolutionary. See
 pp. 1063-64 (Cong. Hale); pp. 1083-85 (Cong. Davis); p. 2500 (Cong. Shanklin); p. 2538 (Cong.
 Rogers); p. 2987 (Sen. Cowan); and p. 3147 (Cong. Harding).
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 Before the Civil War, the states had exercised almost exclusive jurisdiction over
 fundamental rights. Under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, as
 Republicans understood them, Congress could conceivably supplant the states in
 securing civil rights. By virtue of the Constitution's supremacy clause, Congress
 could exercise exclusive authority over citizenship and civil rights and thereby
 destroy state authority as a matter of constitutional law.35 Indeed, Congress
 exercised this authority when it determined by statute and constitutional amend-
 ment which people were citizens and what rights they were to enjoy. The states
 were deprived of their historical authority to make these decisions. Although
 congressional Republicans acknowledged the constitutional revolution in which
 they were engaged, they carefully avoided carrying this revolution to its ultimate
 conclusion of creating a unitary political structure. Republicans did not wish to
 supplant the states in providing a foundation for ordinary civil and criminaljustice.
 On the contrary, they consciously preserved federalism by avoiding unnecessary
 intrusions on state authority over civil rights. Intentionally recognizing concurrent
 authority, Congress restricted its protection of fundamental rights to situations in
 which states and localities failed to protect them.
 The decision of congressional Republicans to preserve state authority over
 ordinary civil and criminal justice has led legal historians to conclude that the
 Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were
 modest increases in national authority.36 The evidence, however, supports the
 belief of the framers that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and the
 1866 statute would bring about revolutionary changes in federal constitutionalism.
 The underlying constitutional authority to enforce civil rights stemmed from the
 constitutional recognition of the status and rights of free people as having the
 status and rights of U.S. citizens. Because the civil rights inherent in citizenship
 were constitutionally guaranteed, the framers believed that Congress, by statute
 and constitutional amendment, could require the states, the traditional guardians
 of these rights, to secure them for all Americans. Congress conferred citizenship
 on all qualified persons in Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth
 Amendment, the framers thereby forcing the states to recognize freed blacks as
 citizens both of the United States and of the states of their residence. The states
 no longer could decide state citizenship for themselves. They were prohibited from
 arbitrarily excluding any qualified persons from state citizenship and from
 refusing to secure the civil rights to which citizenship entitled them. By defining
 natural rights as constitutionally recognized rights of American citizenship,
 Republicans acknowledged that Americans possessed these rights independent of
 state law. That is, if the states were to repeal their legal recognition of these rights,
 citizens could still claim them as constitutionally recognized and secured rights of
 35 This exclusive authority was precisely one of the consequences of Republican constitutionalism
 to which opponents adamantly objected. A modern example of the use of the supremacy clause is the
 exercise by Congress of exclusive authority over interstate commerce, known as the preemption
 doctrine. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Rice
 v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
 36 These historians are cited in note 7.
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 American citizenship. Indeed, James F. Wilson of Iowa made this precise point in
 arguing that the bill was needed because the Southern states failed to recognize
 and secure the rights of certain Americans. Congress had to provide this protection
 and had the power to do so independent of the states.37
 CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE FRAMERS' UNDERSTANDING of civil rights enforcement
 were evidently vague and ambiguous. Determining from the language of the law
 the specific civil rights that individuals possessed as citizens was problematical.
 President Lincoln's attorney general, Edward Bates, in an official opinion,
 discussed the ambiguous definition of the rights of citizens as "generic, common,
 embracing whatever may be lawfully claimed."38 The framers acknowledged the
 legal uncertainty, yet they were unequivocal in declaring that the natural rights to
 life, liberty, and property, and rights incidental to these, were the rights of U.S.
 citizenship that they intended to secure with the Civil Rights Act and the
 Fourteenth Amendment.39 The representative from Ohio, William Lawrence,
 explained the Republican legal theory of civil rights enforcement and the generic
 nature of the rights of citizens that Republicans were attempting to guarantee: "It
 is idle to say that a citizen shall have the right to life, yet to deny him the right to
 labor, whereby alone he can live. It is a mockery to say that a citizen may have a
 right to live, and yet deny him the right to make a contract to secure the privilege
 and the rewards of labor. . . Every citizen, therefore, has the absolute right to live,
 the right of personal security, personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy
 property. These are rights of citizenship. As necessary incidents of these absolute
 rights, there are others, such as the right to make and enforce contracts, to
 purchase, hold, and enjoy property, and to share the benefit of laws for the security
 of person and property."40
 This Republican theory of citizenship and congressionally enforceable civil
 rights led to two important legal consequences. In defining civil rights and the
 privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens as the natural rights of free people, the
 framers provided legal recognition of the civil rights of citizens independent of
 state law. In addition, the framers established an expansive body of nationally
 enforceable civil rights. Wilson explained that "there is no right enumerated in the
 Constitution by general terms or by specific designation which is not definitely
 embodied in one of the rights I have mentioned, or results as an incident necessary
 to complete defense and enjoyment of the specific right."4' The framers created
 the potential for a future Congress or the courts to enforce rights that were not
 specified in the Civil Rights Act, or that, in 1866, may not have been regarded as
 incident to the natural rights to life, liberty, and property encompassed within the
 privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
 37 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, pp. 1117-18.
 38 E. Bates, "Citizenship," Official Opinions of the Attorneys General, 10 (1866): 383, 407.
 39 Cong. Shellabarger complained, "It has been found impossible to settle or define what are all the
 indispensable rights of American citizenship." Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 1293.
 40 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 1756.
 "' Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1 st sess., 1866, pp. 1118-19.
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 Although the enactments of 1866 were radical, the framers' concept of a
 national authority to enforce civil rights was developmental and expansionary. It
 permitted civil rights protection beyond that provided in 1866. Congress subse-
 quently attempted to enforce additional rights more directly. In 1870 and 1871,
 for instance, Congress passed laws that protected political participation and
 political expression by criminalizing certain conspiracies intended to prevent
 people from enforcing their rights of U.S. citizenship. In 1875, Congress legislated
 to desegregate places of public accommodations.42 Judges reflected this develop-
 mental aspect of Republican constitutionalism in interpreting the Civil Rights Act
 of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment as securing rights not enumerated in the
 statute's first section. Federal judges applied the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to
 segregated public facilities and common carriers and held the proprietors liable
 under the first and second sections of the statute for infringing the rights of citizens
 to equal access. Courts sometimes ordered court officers to allow blacks on juries,
 even though the Act did not explicitly guarantee the right to serve or the
 defendant's right to racially integrated juries. Federal judges interpreted the
 privileges and immunities of citizenship secured by the Fourteenth Amendment
 as including the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, such as freedom of speech and
 freedom of assembly.43
 The framers drafted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to describe some of the civil
 rights to which U.S. citizenship entitled citizens, that is, civil rights that the framers
 believed incidental to the generic rights of life, liberty, and property. Section 1
 declares that U.S. citizens "of every race and color . . . shall have the same right
 ... as is enjoyed by white citizens."44 This language appears to confer on citizens
 only a right to racial equality and not the substantive rights per se. In wording
 Section 1 as they did, however, the framers sought to secure these rights of
 citizenship in two ways: by requiring the states to impartially protect the personal
 rights and safety of all persons through systems of civil and criminal justice, and
 by providing a cause of action for those unable to enjoy rights as white citizens
 enjoyed them.
 The framers permitted the states to decide for themselves the conditions under
 which civil rights were to be exercised and enjoyed, as long as the conditions were
 reasonable. Congress permitted the states to vary the enjoyment of civil rights
 according to age, sex, mental capacity, and alienage, since such discriminations
 were considered reasonable and necessary.45 Although Republicans envisioned a
 42 16 Stat. 140 (1870); 17 Stat. 13 (1871); 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
 43 See Scrapbook on the Civil Rights Bill, Edward McPherson Papers, Library of Congress, pp.
 108-11, 119-20, 133-34, 136; and Scrapbook, John Underwood, ed., John C. Underwood Papers,
 Library of Congress, pp. 193, 203, 205, 207. See the New York Times (May 8,1867): 1; (August 9,1867):
 4; (August 30, 1867): 5; (October 17, 1867): 1; (October 20, 1867): 1. See also Slaughterhouse Cases, 15
 F. Cas. 649,652-53 (C.C. La. 1870) (no. 8408); United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 81-82 (C.C. La. 1871)
 (no. 15,282); United States zv. Given, 25 F. Cas. 1328, 1329 (C.C. Del. 1873) (no. 15,211). For a contrary
 view, see Nieman, To Set the Law in Motion, 139.
 44 Section 1 specifies "that all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power,
 excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States"; 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
 45 The Neuw York Evening Post commented that the Civil Rights Act declared who were citizens and
 what rights they had. Yet the Post also insisted that the statute did not "usurp the power of the local
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 national uniformity in the rights that citizens possessed as citizens, they also
 provided for local variations in the ways in which citizens exercised these rights.
 The framers thus preserved a federal constitutional structure of government that
 distributed authority over fundamental rights to both the national and state
 governments but delegated ultimate authority to the national government.
 Judges understood the Republican legal theory of civil rights enforcement
 authority that underlay the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to be a blend of concurrent
 authority and exclusive national authority. Although the fundamental rights of
 citizenship, such as those specified in the Civil Rights Act, were secured to all
 citizens under national law, and the states could not deny these rights to any citizen,
 the states were still permitted to determine the conditions under which these civil
 rights were to be exercised, so long as state law did not conflict with national law
 or until Congress exercised the authority to prescribe these conditions. In 1867,
 Justice Noah H. Swayne clarified the scope of this theory, deciding that the
 Kentucky rules of evidence violated the Civil Rights Act of 1866. These rules
 recognized the right of blacks to testify in Kentucky state courts, but only if no
 white witnesses were available. Observing that the Thirteenth Amendment
 'reversed and annulled the original policy of the constitution" by guaranteeing to
 all Americans the status and rights of free people and delegating to Congress the
 authority to secure the status and rights of citizenship, Justice Swayne held that
 the Civil Rights Act guaranteed black witnesses the right to testify under the same
 conditions white witnesses did.46 On the other hand, the California Supreme Court
 stated in 1869 that if "title to real property of any character may be conveyed by
 writing not under seal, then all citizens, of every race and color, may convey
 property of that character in the same mode."47 California's acceptance of this
 method did not compel any other state to allow similar conveyances. The
 California rule was tenable under national law because it was a reasonable
 regulation of a congressionally enforceable right of U.S. citizenship. The Civil
 Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment thus maintained a concur-
 rence in national and state authority over civil rights.
 Even though fundamental rights of citizens were nationalized, property law,
 contract law, and tort law, among others, remained under state jurisdiction, as did
 criminal law. The deliberate perpetuation of the traditional role of the states in
 securing civil rights, under national scrutiny, is understandable in light of the
 realities that confronted Congress in 1866. Despite the vast increase in the power
 legislature to prescribe in what manner the rights of person and property shall be secured. A distinction
 is to be taken here which the President's Veto message overlooks. Congress does not in this bill say by
 what rules evidence shall be given in courts, by what tenure property shall be held, or how a citizen
 shall be protected in his occupation. It only says to the states, whatever laws you pass in regard to these
 matters, make them general; make them for the benefit of one race as well as for another." Clipping
 in Scrapbook on the Civil Rights Bill, Edward McPherson Papers, Library of Congress, p. 32.
 46 United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785,794 (C.C. Ky. 1867) (no. 16,151). By 1869, the states generally
 recognized the right of blacks to testify as a congressionally secured right of citizenship. Ex parte Warren,
 31 Tex. 147 (1868); Kelley v. Arkansas, 25 Ark. 392 (1869); State v. Washington, 36 Cal. 658 (1869); State
 v. Underwood, 63 N.C. 98 (1869).
 47 State v. Washington, 36 Cal. 666-67 (1869).
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 of the national government and the heightened sense of nationalism generated by
 the Civil War, the states were still better suited to be the guardians of civil rights.
 The national government simply did not have the resources to take on this new
 function without the assistance of state governments. Nor was it necessary, let alone
 desirable, for the national government to supplant state civil and criminal codes,
 courts, and enforcement agencies, or to handle ordinary crimes and civil suits.48
 Another point of debate over the framers' concept of a congressional civil rights
 enforcement authority concerns whether the framers merely intended to secure
 a racial equality in state law or whether they intended to protect rights directly. I
 have argued that the framers believed Congress possessed the authority to enforce
 civil rights directly and to redress any violations of civil rights. Whether or not
 Congress chose to exercise this authority to its full extent, however, is another
 question. The framers' understanding of the full scope of congressional authority
 to enforce civil rights is a separate question from that of the scope of authority the
 framers exercised to enforce civil rights in 1866. Whatever the framers' intent, they
 permitted the statute and the amendment to go forward with the revolutionary
 potential that a broad reading entailed.
 Federal legal officers and judges certainly interpreted and applied the statute
 to secure more than racially impartial state law. The Civil Rights Act authorized
 these law enforcement officers to directly redress civil and criminal violations of
 civil rights. Sections 1 and 3, as they were applied by federal officers, created a
 private civil cause of action for the infringement of the rights that the Civil Rights
 Act secured.49 Section 2 created a misdemeanor punishable in the federal courts
 whenever a person, acting under pretext of law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
 custom, violated the civil rights secured by Section 1.5 Section 3 authorized the
 federal courts to supplant state and local courts and to sit as courts of primary civil
 and criminal jurisdiction in specified circumstances. It provided for the removal
 to the federal district and circuit courts of "all causes, civil and criminal, affecting
 persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the courts orjudicial tribunals of the
 state or locality where they may be any of the rights secured to them by the first
 section." If local law enforcement officers failed to arrest and hold for trial alleged
 criminals, the military and federal marshals were authorized to do so; if the state
 court then failed to try the defendants, they were to be tried in the federal court.5'
 48 Nevertheless, the creation of the Department of Justice and the reorganization of the office of
 Attorney General in 1870 was a congressional recognition of the expanded jurisdiction and increased
 legal business of the national government. This reorganization was an attempt by Congress to increase
 efficiency in the handling of the nation's burgeoning legal affairs. However, Harold Hyman has noted
 an anti-bureaucratic bias in this period that sharply curtailed the effectiveness of governmental action
 in meeting the needs of Americans. Kaczorowski, Politics of Judicial Interpretation, 79; Hyman, A More
 Perfect Union, chaps. 17-22, 25.
 49 In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C. Md. 1867) (no. 14,247); Kaczorowski, Politics of Judicial
 Interpretation, 27-48.
 50 Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 refers to citizens and specifies some of the rights that
 citizens are to enjoy; Section 2 specifies certain infringements of these rights regardless of whether or
 not the victim is a citizen. 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
 51 Federal legal officers-U.S. attorneys, marshals, and Freedmen's Bureau agents-and federal
 judges interpreted the Civil Rights Act in this way. They were instrumental in prosecuting crimes
 committed by whites against blacks when, immediately after the Civil War, local law enforcement
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 Section 3 also authorized removal in situations in which a state defendant, civil or
 criminal, could not receive impartial justice. In each of these instances, federal
 agencies and officers exercised primary jurisdiction and administered justice as if
 they were state and local agencies and officers.
 OTHER ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT were taken directly
 from the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which had been adopted to implement the
 fugitive slave clause of the Constitution.52 The statute authorized, even required,
 federal judges and law officers to return runaway slaves to their owners. The
 Supreme Court had interpreted the fugitive slave clause as conferring on slave-
 owners an unqualified right of property in their slaves, a right that delegated to
 "the national government . .. appropriate authority and functions to enforce it"
 through national legislative, judicial, and executive agencies independent of the
 states.53 The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 secured a fundamental right of U.S.
 citizenship and formed a model for the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The framers
 recognized the irony of using a statute adopted to assure the rights of slaveowners
 as the model for legislation to secure the rights of their former slaves. Senator
 Lyman Trumbull of Illinois approved this connection when he admonished the
 Congress: "Surely we have the authority to enact a law as efficient in the interests
 of freedom, now that freedom prevails throughout the country, as we had in the
 interest of slavery when it prevailed in a portion of the country."54 The Fugitive
 Slave Act of 1850 served the cause of civil rights in 1866 in two ways. It provided
 a blueprint for the direct enforcement of constitutional rights in national courts
 by national legal agencies. It also provided a precedent for congressional legis-
 lation enacted to enforce rights over which the states had previously exercised
 jurisdiction.
 Some supporters of the bill explicitly expressed their intention to delegate to the
 federal courts the primary jurisdiction over civil rights. When Wilson introduced
 the Civil Rights Bill in the House, he declared that U.S. citizens were entitled to
 the great fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property that free governments
 are obliged to secure, and that, because the states refused to protect these rights
 for some citizens, "we must do our duty by supplying the protection which the
 states deny." The Republican senator from Indiana, Henry S. Lane, expressed the
 same understanding in the Senate and declared: "Neither thejudge, nor thejury,
 nor the officer as we believe is willing to execute the law . .. We should not legislate
 at all if we believed the State courts could or would honestly carry out the provisions
 of the Thirteenth Constitutional Amendment; but because we believe they will not
 agencies would not. See Kaczorowski, Politics ofJudicialInterpretation, 8-12, 27-48. The Supreme Court
 subsequently interpreted Section 3 narrowly in a technical ruling that eliminated the criminal
 jurisdiction over these crimes (pp. 135-43). The Supreme Court's decision is cited in Blyew and Kennard
 v. United States, 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 581 (1872).
 52 27 Stat. 14, sects. 4-9 (1866); 9 Stat. 462 (1850).
 53 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. (41 U.S.) 539, 615, 623 (1842).
 54 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 475.
This content downloaded from 150.108.60.10 on Thu, 08 Mar 2018 23:11:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 60 RobertJ. Kaczorowski
 do that, we give the Federal officers jurisdiction."55 When the congressional
 proponents of civil rights enforcement stated that civil rights were to be secured
 within the states, and when congressional opponents complained that Congress
 was changing the relationship between citizens and the state governments, both
 groups were referring to this assumption of state police powers by federal officers
 and agencies. Federal legal officers and law enforcement agencies performed state
 police functions and administered civil and criminal justice when local law
 enforcement agents and agencies would not.56
 Congress enacted this statute to enforce civil rights because the Republican
 majority believed that Congress possessed primary authority over the civil rights
 of American citizens. Congress would neither have conferred thejurisdiction it did
 on federal agencies and officers nor legislated to secure civil rights two years prior
 to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, if a majority of members had
 believed that these powers were constitutionally reserved to the states, as the
 Supreme Court declared in 1873 and 1876.57 The decision by Congress to confer
 on federal courts the jurisdiction to try criminal offenses and civil disputes
 supports the view that the framers believed that the Thirteenth Amendment
 delegated to Congress primary authority over civil rights.
 The framers' interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment as a general
 guarantee of the natural rights of free people led to their inclusion of white
 Americans within the protective guarantees of the Civil Rights Act. The framers
 were explicit in expressing their intention to secure the civil rights of all Americans.
 Senator Trumbull stated that the Civil Rights Bill "applies to white men as well as
 black men. It declares that all persons in the United States shall be entitled to the
 same civil rights."58 A few years later, to combat the Ku Klux Klan, many of these
 samne senators and representatives adopted additional legislation that defined as
 federal crimes certain civil rights violations and conspiracies to violate civil rights
 without requiring racial prejudice as an element of the offense. Also, U.S. attorneys
 did not charge defendants with racial discrimination to bring violations of civil
 rights within federal jurisdiction under these statutes. The gist of the offense was
 the intention to deprive U.S. citizens of their rights.59
 55 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 1118 (Cong. Wilson); pp. 602-03 (Sen. Lane).
 56 See Kaczorowski, Politics of Judicial Interpretation, 27-48, 52-53, 79-115.
 57 Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36 (1873); United States v. Cruikshank, 2 Otto (92 U.S.) 542
 (1876).
 58 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 599. See also p.474 (Sen. Trumbull); pp. 504-05
 (Sen. Johnson); p. 595 (Sen. Davis); p. 603 (Sen. Cowan); p. 3035 (Sen. Henderson); pp. 1066-67
 (Cong. Price); p. 1 17 (Cong. Wilson); pp. I 120-21 (Cong. Rogers); pp. 1263, 1265 (Cong. Broomall);
 p. 1264 (Spencer Colfax); pp. 1291, 2542 (Cong. Bingham); p. 1853 (Cong. Lawrence). See newspaper
 clippings on the topic in Scrapbook on the Civil Rights Bill, Edward McPherson Papers, Library of
 Congress, pp. 4, 26, 32, 37, 47, 53, 58, 62, 78, 79, 132; clippings in Scrapbook on the Fourteenth
 Amendment, Edward McPherson Papers, pp. 17, 29, 31, 41, 53, 63, 82.
 59 16 Stat. 140 (1870); 17 Stat. 13 (1871). U.S. DistrictJudge Richard Busteed to Attorney General
 Amos T. Akerman, 22 November 1871, Source Chronological File, Northern District of Alabama,
 Department ofJustice Records, National Archives; Charge to GrandJury, enclosed in above letter; U.S.
 Attorney E. P. Jacobson to Amos Akerman, 4 and 7 August 1871, Source Chronological File, Southern
 District of Mississippi, Department ofJustice, National Archives;Jacobson to Attorney General George
 Williams, 17 February 1872, ibid.; U.S. Attorney G. Wiley Wells to George Williams, 5 March and 2
 April 1872, Source Chronological File, Northern District of Mississippi, Department of Justice,
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 The recognition of Congress as having the primary constitutional authority over
 the personal security and civil rights of American citizens presented the danger
 that the national government would supplant state and local governments in their
 ordinary police functions. In 1866, opponents of the Civil Rights Bill loudly
 protested that this was precisely the bill's effect.60 The framers confronted this
 difficult problem of preserving federalism when they attempted to make civil
 rights violations federal crimes punishable in the federal courts. The framers
 attempted to distinguish federal crimes from ordinary crimes by limiting federal
 criminal violations of civil rights to acts committed "under color of any law, statute,
 ordinance, regulation, or custom." Wilson explained that Congress was "not
 making a general criminal code for the states."6' On the contrary, the supporters
 wished to preserve the state administration of ordinary criminal justice. Although
 the framers of the Civil Rights Acts of 1870 and 1871 expressed the same desire,
 under these statutes, officers of the Department of Justice and federal judges in
 some areas of the Southern states did replace local authorities who were
 overwhelmed by the Klan and administered criminal justice for them.62
 The framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 also limited its scope because they
 intended to match federal sanctions to the specific violations of civil rights that
 required national intervention, just as the framers of the 1870 and 1871 statutes
 specified other kinds of offenses that confronted them. In other words, they
 shaped federal criminal sanctions to provide effective civil rights protection where
 and when it was needed. Black victims of racially motivated civil rights violations
 who were unable to redress their grievances within the state criminaljustice system
 had the greatest need for federal protection in 1866; consequently, the Act mnade
 civil rights violations that were motivated by discriminatory intent federal crimes.
 Senator Trumbull explained that the words, "'under color of law' were inserted
 as words of limitation . . . If an offense is committed against a colored person
 simply because he is colored, in a state where the law affords the same protection
 as if he were white, this act neither has nor was intended to have anything to do
 with his case, because he has adequate protection in the State Courts; but if he is
 discriminated against under color of State law because he is colored, then it becomes
 necessary to interfere for his protection."63 Discriminatory intent conceivably included
 political prejudice, since white Unionists were also to be protected. Because state
 National Archives; U.S. District Judge Robert A. Hill to Solicitor General Benjamin Bristow, 13 May
 1872, Benjamin H. Bristow Papers, Library of Congress; Joint Select Committee on the Condition of
 Affairs in the late Insurrectionary States, Report, 42nd Cong., 2d sess., S. Rept. 41 (1871), vol. 12, pp.
 934-87. I discuss this subject in Politics of Judicial Interpretation, 1 17-34.
 60 Sen. Willard Saulsbury of Delaware warned that the Civil Rights Bill "positively deprives the State
 of its police power of government." Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 478. Sen. Davis
 identified specific areas of state jurisdiction that Democrats feared would be supplanted by the Civil
 Rights Bill when he espoused the state sovereignty theory of federalism and exclusive state authority
 over civil rights. See p. 596.
 61 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 1120.
 62 This history is recounted in Kaczorowski, Politics of Judicial Interpretation, 50-134.
 63 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 1758, emphasis added. Sen. Trumbull's
 comments were made in rebuttal to Pres. Johnson's objection that the Civil Rights Act would deprive
 state courts of all cases affecting persons who were discriminated against, not simply those cases
 involving a discrimination. See Pres. Johnson's veto message on p. 1680.
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 laws and courts could be relied on to provide adequate remedies for ordinary
 violations of the rights to life, liberty, and property, Section 2 of the Civil Rights
 Act constituted an additional sanction for these violations when they were
 committed under a discriminatory law or custom. As Senator Trumbull described
 it, the framers believed a federal sanction was required because victims would be
 unable to secure their rights when the violations stemmed from discriminatory
 laws or community prejudices.
 The framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment
 did not intend federal jurisdiction over civil rights to be limited to racially
 discriminatory state action, as the Supreme Court later held in Slaughterhouse and
 Cruikshank. Federal agents who removed cases from local authorities under Section
 3 assumed their powers were broad. Judge Adjutant General of the Army, Joseph
 Holt, for instance, interpreted the statute as authorization for removal in a case
 in which a former Freedman's Bureau agent claimed that he was being harrassed
 with a false prosecution in a Louisiana court because of the official assistance he
 had given to blacks. When the statejudge, Edmund Abell, refused to allow the case
 to be removed to the federal district court, federal officers arrested him and
 charged him with violating the Civil Rights Act.64 In another case, the U.S. Circuit
 Court held that white butchers in New Orleans had a claim against a slaughter-
 house corporation chartered by the state, which the butchers alleged had
 interfered with rights they enjoyed under the Civil Rights Act, namely, the rights
 to labor, enter into contracts, and to equal benefit of the law for protection of
 person and property.65
 THE FRAMERS NEVER QUESTIONED THE AUTHORITY OF CONGRESS to confer jurisdic-
 tion on the federal courts to try and punish civil rights violators. Congress
 possessed this authority, they believed, because civil rights were nationally
 enforceable rights of U.S. citizenship, under the Thirteenth Amendment and
 Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act.66 Hence, Congress possessed the authority to
 prescribe criminal sanctions to secure these rights. The critical issue was whether
 or not Congress possessed the authority to secure civil rights at all, not whether
 Congress possessed the authority to provide criminal sanctions for persons who
 violated its statutes. Congress spent little time discussing whether it could punish
 private individuals who violated the Civil Rights Bill. If one conceded that
 Congress possessed the authority to secure civil rights, it was too obvious for
 discussion that it also possessed authority to punish violators of its statutes that
 secured civil rights. The issue the framers found troublesome in this regard was
 the propriety of authorizing the federal courts to punish state officers who violated
 civil rights when they acted under the authority of state laws. Punishing state
 64 Kaczorowski, Politics ofJudicial Interpretation, 34, 45, n. 16.
 65 Slaughterhouse Cases, 15 F. Cas. 655; reversed on other grounds, Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. (83
 U.S.) 36. See also United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79.
 66 The framers generally believed that the authority to secure civil rights of citizens "belongs to every
 sovereign power, and is essentially a subject of national jurisdiction." Congressional Globe, 39th Cong.,
 1st sess., 1866, p. 1090 (Cong. Bingham).
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 officers acting in their official capacities represented a serious breach of federal
 comity. Confrontations between national and state authority, always sensitive
 matters, were especially so following the Civil War.
 Opponents of the Civil Rights Act questioned the legality of prosecuting state
 officials for actions that were committed under the sanction of state law.67 Debate
 focused on the punishment of state judges who applied racially discriminatory
 state statutes instead of declaring them unconstitutional. Opponents pointed out
 the injustice of a public policy that sought to punish a state judge who, believing
 the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to be unconstitutional, enforced a state statute he
 believed to be lawful. The criminal prosecution and punishment of state officials
 was far more controversial than that of ordinary citizens because it involved a direct
 confrontation between national and state authority. Troubled by this apparent
 breach in federalism, proponents of the Civil Rights Act nevertheless insisted on
 the need to punish anyone who violated nationally enforceable civil rights and
 flouted the statutes Congress enacted to secure them, even if that person were a
 judge. Senator Trumbull was adamant: "The right to punish individuals who
 violate the laws of the United States cannot be questioned, and the fact that in doing
 so they acted under color of law or usage in any locality affords no protection;
 because by the Constitution that instrument and the laws passed in pursuance
 thereof are the supreme law of the land, and every judge, not only of the United
 States, but of every State court is bound thereby."68
 Even though the inclusion of public officials within the penal sections of the Act
 was extraordinary, the framers insisted that prosecuting them for civil rights
 offenses was imperative. Punishing political leaders for civil rights violations would
 be far more effective in curbing these crimes than punishing ordinary citizens
 would. Senator Trumbull elaborated: "When it comes to be understood in all parts
 of the United States that any person who shall deprive another of any right or
 subject him to any punishment in consequence of his color or race will expose
 himself to fine and imprisonment, I think such acts will cease."69 The framers
 hoped the public would realize that even those thought to be beyond prosecution
 because they wielded governmental authority were subject to the Act's provi-
 sions.70
 Whereas most of the discussion of Section 2 in Congress focused on statejudges
 as the targets of the penal provisions of the Act, the debates suggest that this section
 was not intended to apply only to public officials. When Senator Edgar Cowan of
 Pennsylvania objected that these penal provisions singled out state officials for
 criminal prosecution, Trumbull denied this. Cowan asked, "Is there not a
 67 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., l st sess., 1866, pp.601-02 (Sen. Hendricks); p. 1783 (Sen. Cowan);
 Appendix 183 (Sen. Davis); pp. 1154-55 (Cong. Eldridge); p. 1265 (Cong. Davis); p. 1267 (Cong.
 Raymond); and p. 1271 (Cong. Kerr).
 68 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 1759.
 69 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 475.
 70 The Department of Justice and the federal courts in some Southern states engaged in a massive
 effort to bring Ku Klux Klansmen to justice for terrorizing Southern blacks and their white Unionist
 allies. The government's policy was to select the most prominent defendants for prosecution.
 Kaczorowski, Politics of Judicial Interpretation, 79-99.
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 provision by which State officials are to be punished?" Trumbull replied, "Not State
 officials especially, but everyone who violates the law. It is the intention to punish
 everybody who violates the law."'7' Trumbull repeated this construction in urging
 the Senate to enact the Civil Rights Act over President Johnson's veto.72 Although
 the language of Section 2 can support a reading that limits its application to state
 officers, such a reading contradicts Senator Trumbull's explicit interpretation of
 its scope. In light of the framers' concept of a congressional authority to enforce
 civil rights that permitted Congress to punish any individual who violated the
 statute, not to accept the position of Senator Trumbull, the author and Senate floor
 manager, would be illogical and contradictory to the record, especially when
 virtually no one in Congress disagreed with him. That federal legal officers and
 judges interpreted the statute consistent with Senator Trumbull's position makes
 this conclusion even stronger.73 It appears, then, that the framers of the Civil
 Rights Act of 1866 did not intend to apply the criminal penalties of Section 2 only
 to state officers. Their comments evince their intention to punish even state officials
 who violated the civil rights of American citizens.
 Congressional supporters and opponents of the Civil Rights Act expressed the
 same concerns and intentions in discussing the statute's third section. This section
 authorizes removal of a case from the state courts when the parties seeking removal
 cannot enforce their civil rights or the state's legal process is violating their civil
 rights. Although the framers expected state agencies to handle ordinary civil and
 criminal cases, they understood that local officials were failing to protect the rights
 of many citizens and to administer civil and criminal justice in a racially and
 politically impartial manner.74 To make the enforcement of nationally secured
 rights effective, the framers gave the federal courts the primary civil and criminal
 jurisdiction over civil rights when state agencies failed to secure them. It is crucial
 to note that federal legal officers and judges understood that it was the inability
 of the citizen to enforce a civil right in a state court, not the existence of racially
 discriminatory state laws, that permitted the individual to remove the case to a
 federal court.75 The statute's congressional supporters manifested the same
 understanding.
 The framers thus distinguished ordinary cases in which state agencies enforced
 and protected the rights of citizens from cases in which the federal courts would
 have to takejurisdiction because of state intransigence. A party could remove a case
 to a federal court if the state court enforced discriminatory laws, Senator Trumbull
 maintained, "or, if undertaking to enforce his right in a State court he was denied
 that right, then he could go into a Federal court; but it by no means follows that
 7' Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 500.
 72 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 1758.
 73 Suits were brought against private proprietors of public facilities and public carriers who were
 fined for excluding blacks from their facilities. See McPherson's and Underwood's Scrapbooks cited
 in note 43.
 74 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, pp. 602-03 (Sen. Lane of Indiana); pp. 600, 1760
 (Sen. Trumbull); p. 1785 (Sen. Stewart); p. 2967 (Sen. Poland); p. 1119 (Cong. Wilson); p. 1293 (Cong.
 Bingham); pp. 1293-94 (Cong. Shellabarger); pp. 1832-36 (Cong. Lawrence).
 75 See Kaczorowski, Politics of Judicial Interpretation, 8-10.
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 every person would have a right in thefirst instance to go to the Federal court because
 there was on the statute book of the State a law discriminating against him, the
 presumption being- that the judge of the court, when he comes to act on the case,
 would, in the obedience to the paramount law of the United States, hold the State
 statute invalid."76 The authority to remove a case, then, was triggered when a
 citizen alleged that the state court would not enforce a civil right.
 Although the discriminatory action or inaction of the state might create a
 situation in which federal enforcement of civil rights was necessary, this was not
 the basis of federaljurisdiction. The third section of the Civil Rights Act conferred
 jurisdiction on the federal courts when the citizen was unable to enforce a civil right
 in the state courts. It was the citizen's lack of success that Senator Trumbull
 emphasized. He distinguished between cases in which state laws discriminated but
 the state court enforced the citizen's right anyway, and cases in which the laws did
 not discriminate, but, for some other reason, such as the racial or political prejudice
 of the judge or jury, the citizen was still unable to enforce the right in the state
 courts. Senator Trumbull asserted that Congress had authority over both: "If it
 be necessary in order to protect the freedman in his rights that he should have
 authority to go into the Federal courts in all cases where a custom prevails in a State,
 or where there is a Statute-law of the State discriminating against him, I think we
 have the authority to confer that jurisdiction."77 Senator Trumbull was referring
 to invidious treatment of blacks, but protection against politically discriminatory
 customs was also essential to support white political allies in the South. If federal
 law merely prohibited racially discriminatory state laws, white Unionists would not
 have been afforded the protection under federal law the framers intended to
 provide them.78
 The framers did not believe that federal protection was required in all cases
 involving discriminatory laws and customs. If they had, the Civil Rights Act would
 have been made applicable whenever the laws and customs of a community or a
 state discriminated. Senator Trumbull observed that a person was not necessarily
 "discriminated against because there may be a custom in the community discrim-
 inating against him, nor because the legislature may have passed a statute
 discriminating against him."79 The Civil Rights Act would have invalidated the law
 76 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 1759, emphasis added.
 7 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 1759. For a contrary view, see Fairman,
 Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-88, 1238-44.
 78 In addition to the obvious need to protect blacks and white Unionists from overt hostility, Section
 3 also addresses more subtle forms, such as that described by Southern Unionists who petitioned
 congressional Republicans to conferjurisdiction on the federal courts to enforce their economic rights.
 Unionist creditors who rejected Confederate money in payment of debts risked having those debts
 cancelled by state statute and rendered unenforceable in state courts. They pleaded for access to the
 federal courts to enforce these debts and other contracts that they believed political prejudice prevented
 them from enforcing in the state courts. T. J. Gretlows to Lyman Trumbull, 8 and 19 January 1866,
 Trumbull Papers, Library of Congress; George A. Custer to Zachariah Chandler, 14 January 1866,
 Zachariah Chandler Papers, Library of Congress. A concern for economic rights could explain the U.S.
 Circuit Court's decision applying the Civil Rights Act to protect white butchers who claimed that their
 civil rights under the Act were violated when the state conferred monopolistic privileges on a
 slaughterhouse corporation. Slaughterhouse Cases, 15 F. Cas. 655.
 79 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 1759.
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 or custom, and Trumbull presumed that a state court would so hold. Therefore,
 however naively, Trumbull assumed that individuals might still be able to enforce
 their rights in the state courts despite the presence of discriminatory laws and
 customs.
 The framers expressly distinguished between racially discriminatory laws and
 the actions of individuals who violated civil rights and asserted their intention of
 protecting against both. Senator Trumbull stated that the Civil Rights Act
 conferred on the courts of the United States jurisdiction "over all persons
 committing offenses against the provisions of this act, and also over the cases of
 persons who are discriminated against by State laws or customs."80 Senator Lane
 also understood the statute's scope to include the actions of individuals acting
 under "the power of local prejudice to override the laws of the country."8' Both
 senators expected the federal military to aid the federaljudicial process "whenever
 there is a combination of persons in any of the rebellious states so powerful that
 the marshals and civil officers in the ordinary course ofjudicial proceedings cannot
 execute the law."82 This concept of federal action presaged the Enforcement Act
 of 1871 and the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, which were directed at this kind of
 lawlessness.
 Civil rights were doubly secured under the first three sections of the Civil Rights
 Act of 1866. A private cause of action was created for black citizens unable to
 exercise civil rights under the same conditions as white citizens, and anyone who
 infringed a citizen's civil rights under pretext of law or custom was subject to
 prosecution and punishment in the federal courts. In addition, the federal courts
 were authorized to assume original jurisdiction of civil and criminal cases when
 citizens were unable to enforce their rights in the state courts. Congress thus
 applied national authority directly to private individuals as well as to public
 officials. The framers asserted that Congress possessed this authority because they
 assumed that civil rights were recognized by the Constitution as rights of U.S.
 citizens.
 Federal judges and legal officers interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment, the
 Fourteenth Amendment, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as conferring a broad
 authority to enforce civil rights directly, irrespective of the presence of discrim-
 inatory state action and regardless of the source of the violation, because these
 rights were the natural rights that belonged to all free citizens of a free republic.
 Indeed, the notion that a national civil rights enforcement authority was merely
 a guarantee of racially impartial government action was not judicially recognized
 in the federal courts until the Supreme Court's decisions in the 1870s.83
 The Supreme Court's decisions narrowing enforcement authority reflected the
 North's diminished interest in Reconstruction.84 By the 1870s, the Republican
 80 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 475.
 81 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 603.
 82 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 605.
 83 Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36; United States v. Cruikshank, 2 Otto (92 U.S.) 542;
 Kaczorowski, Politics of Judicial Interpretation, 1-48, 117-97.
 84 For a contrary view, see Michael Les Benedict, "Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the
 Waite Court," Supreme Court Review (1978): 39.
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 party, a coalition of diverse political groups, began to fragment further over the
 policies and corruption of Ulysses S. Grant's presidency.85 One group split away
 during Grant's first administration to form a separate party, the Liberal Repub-
 licans. They turned against Grant's Southern policy and resisted congressional
 interference in the South. Liberal Republicans also fought to curtail the size and
 power of the national government and to return political authority to local
 government. Their objectives indicated their desire for a return to normality and
 their interest in increasing states' rights for the purpose of controlling monopolies
 and the railroads. Some of the leaders of civil rights enforcement joined this
 movement. Lyman Trumbull was one. Reflecting these new political pressures, he
 changed his views regarding a national authority to enforce civil rights. By 1871,
 he was insisting that the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment
 applied only to racially discriminatory state action, and that they guaranteed no
 more than racial equality in state-conferred rights and a prohibition against racially
 discriminatory state laws.86 By July of 1873, the Grant administration also lost
 interest in Reconstruction and ended its policy of civil rights enforcement.87
 Except for a few minor episodes of federal involvement in Southern affairs, black
 and white Republicans in the South were left on their own. Insofar as the
 enforcement of civil rights was concerned, Reconstruction ended long before the
 Compromise of 1877.
 As THE REPUBLICAN FRAMERS UNDERSTOOD THEM, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
 Amendments were constitutionally revolutionary. These amendments delegated
 to Congress the authority to render a radical change in the role of the national
 government in American life. Congress and the federal courts had not participated
 to any great extent before 1860 in guaranteeing the fundamental and personal
 rights of citizens. Republicans chose to protect these rights in 1866 by enacting the
 Civil Rights Act, which conferred on the federal courts jurisdiction over and
 responsibility for enforcing the personal rights of citizens directly when citizens
 could not do so in the traditional institutions, namely, the state and local courts.
 This new role for national institutions involved radical changes in constitutional
 law. Fundamental rights were secured and enforced through state law before the
 Civil War, but, afterwards, the civil rights statutes made fundamental rights a
 matter of national jurisdiction. The fundamental rights of citizens were now
 defined as rights pertaining to U.S. citizenship and, as such, were recognized by
 the Constitution and laws of the United States. Although the states were expected
 to continue in their traditional function of securing civil rights, their authority was
 to be shared with Congress and the federal courts. Because federal law was
 supreme, Congress and the federal courts could supplant all state authority over
 personal rights. The framers' legal theory of citizenship and congressional
 authority over the rights of citizens held the potential of ending federalism and
 85 For an excellent political history of the period, see William Gillette, Retreat from Reconstruction,
 1869-1879 (Baton Rouge, La., 1979).
 86 Congressional Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st sess., 1871, pp. 575-76.
 87 Kaczorowski, Politics of Judicial Interpretation, 11 1.
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 establishing a consolidated, unitary state. That the framers eschewed this extreme
 institutional arrangement should not deflect attention from the other ways in
 which civil rights amendments and laws of Reconstruction represented, to the
 framers and federal legal officers, a revolutionary constitutionalism and a new
 American federalism centered in national authority and national institutions.
 In the 1870s, the Supreme Court rejected the revolutionary congressional
 Republican theory of constitutionalism and read into the Thirteenth and Four-
 teenth Amendments the theory of states' rights promoted by congressional
 Conservative Democrats. The Court explicitly rejected the broader theory of a
 congressional civil rights enforcement authority, precisely because it was revolu-
 tionary. The Supreme Court preserved a modified theory of state sovereignty,
 resurrected a theory of American federalism based on states' rights, and
 recognized primary authority over citizenship and civil rights as residing in the
 states. Although American law denied the right of secession, it adopted other
 important elements of the antebellum theory of constitutionalism. Congressional
 framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 may have
 thought they were reconstructing American government and basing it on a
 revolutionary constitutional foundation, but the Supreme Court decided against
 this revolutionary constitutionalism in a reactionary resurgence of states' rights
 that resulted in the virtual reenslavement of Southern black Americans.
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